Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a Financial Crisis: The Case of Canada by Jason Allen et al.
 
Working Paper/Document de travail 
2011-17 
Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity 
Demand during a Financial Crisis: 
The Case of Canada 
by Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu and Jakub Kastl 
 
   2
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2011-17 
August 2011 
Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity 
Demand during a Financial Crisis: 




2 and Jakub Kastl
3 
  1Financial Stability Department 
Bank of Canada 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9 
jallen@bankofcanada.ca 
 
2Department of Economics 
University of Chicago and NBER 
 
3Department of Economics 
Stanford University and NBER 
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in 
economics and finance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
ISSN 1701-9397  © 2011 Bank of Canada  
   ii
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank John Asker, James Chapman, Darrell Duffie, Toni Gravelle, 
James Thompson, Karen McGuinness, Virginie Traclet and seminar participants at the 
Bank of Canada, Duke, Stanford, Yale, the 2010 MTS Conference on Financial Markets 
(London), New York Fed auctions workshop, and 2011 AEAs (Denver). Sheisha 
Kulkarni and Iiro Makinen provided outstanding research assistance. We thank the 
Canadian Payments Association who collect the payments data. Any errors are our own.   iii
Abstract 
This paper explores the reliability of using prices of credit default swap contracts (CDS) 
as indicators of default probabilities during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. We use data 
from the Canadian financial system to show that these publicly available risk measures, 
while indicative of initial problems of the financial system as a whole, do not seem to 
correspond to risks implied by the cross-sectional heterogeneity in bank behavior in 
short-term lending markets. Strategies in, and reliance on the payments system as well as 
special liquidity-supplying tools provided by the central bank seem to be more important 
additional indicators of distress of individual banks, or lack thereof than the CDSs. It 
therefore seems that central banks should utilize high-frequency data on liquidity demand 
to obtain a better picture of financial health of individual participants of the financial 
system. 
JEL classification: G01, G28, E42, E58 
Bank classification: Financial institutions; Financial markets; Payment, clearing, and 
settlement systems 
Résumé 
Les auteurs analysent la fiabilité des prix des contrats de swap sur défaillance comme 
indicateurs des probabilités de défaut durant la crise financière de 2007-2008. À partir de 
données issues du système financier canadien, ils montrent que si ces mesures du risque 
accessibles au public sont révélatrices des difficultés initiales éprouvées par l’ensemble 
du système financier, néanmoins, elles ne permettent pas une appréciation des risques 
qu’implique l’hétérogénéité des comportements des banques sur le marché des prêts à 
court terme. Les stratégies adoptées au sein du système de paiement et l’ampleur du 
recours aux mécanismes d’octroi de liquidités, aussi bien courants qu’exceptionnels, des 
banques centrales semblent être des indicateurs additionnels plus utiles de la situation de 
liquidité de banques particulières que les contrats de swap. Les banques centrales 
devraient par conséquent se servir des données de haute fréquence relatives à la demande 
de liquidité pour se faire une idée plus juste de la santé financière des divers participants 
au système financier. 
Classification JEL : G01, G28, E42, E58 
Classification de la Banque : Institutions financières; Marchés financiers; Systèmes de 
paiement, de compensation et de règlement 
 
 The aim of this paper is to analyze risk and liquidity demand during the ﬁnancial crisis and to compare
default risk implied by Credit Default Swap (CDS) prices to other measures of ﬁnancial distress derived
from the behavior of individual banks in the payments system and in the liquidity facilities of the central
bank. We use the Canadian banking sector as the case study for our analysis. We begin by analyzing the
demand for liquidity on an individual bank level by using data from the Bank of Canada’s term purchase
and resale agreement auctions (PRA). These auctions provided cheap short-term liquidity to banks during
the crisis in exchange for high quality collateral. Contrary to the experience in Europe (Cassola, Horta¸ csu
and Kastl (2011)), the Canadian banks did not use the facility aggressively for a sustained period of time.
We demonstrate that while Canadian banks’ willingness-to-pay for liquidity increased substantially after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, this increase was temporary. The system settled back
to its normal state by mid-November 2008.
In contrast to public measures of bank risk (such as CDS prices), which varied widely both cross-
sectionally and in the time-series, we show that Canadian banks’ bidding behavior in the liquidity auctions
as well as their behavior in the payment system and overnight interbank market was largely indicative of low
risk. The fact that overnight market remained quite active throughout the crisis – total loans transacted
stayed virtually unchanged while prices actually fell – indicates that participants did not believe there
were signiﬁcant liquidity or counterparty risks. Similarly, Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) ﬁnd that the
overnight Feds Fund market remained active following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, although they
do ﬁnd evidence of increased counterparty risk. We argue that the impact of various liquidity-providing
actions undertaken by the cental bank and federal government during 2008 might have led to a surplus
of liquidity in the market, resulting in overnight unsecured loans transacting even below the target rate.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that during the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis in the summer of 2007,
when these extraordinary liquidity facilities did not exist, interbank rates did increase. Similar to Acharya
and Merrouche (2010) this suggests liquidity was more scarce at this time. In neither episode, however, do
we ﬁnd evidence of an increase in counterparty risk.
Since CDS rates are long term spreads (typically 5 years), they may contain additional information
than that contained in the short-term money rate spreads. For example, they are aﬀected by diﬀerent
triggering events, have diﬀerent deliverable instruments and cheapest-to-deliver recovery eﬀects. On the
other hand, a standard equilibrium term structure model (see for example Ang and Piazzesi (2003)) yields
the prediction that a suﬃciently large change in the long-term spread should be accompanied by a change
in the short-term spread in the same direction. If this were not the case then either one of the equilibrium
no-arbitrage conditions is violated or the spreads (either the short term, long term or both) is measured
with error. Since the CDS rates are typically dealer quotes and may therefore not reﬂect a real transaction
1price, while the short term spreads are actual transaction prices, miss-measurement is more likely to occur
in case of the CDS spreads. We will provide evidence that in the case of Canadian ﬁnancial institutions, for
which CDS spreads varied substantially both in the cross-section and in the time series, the corresponding
variation in the short-term spreads was lacking. We will argue based on further indirect evidence that
it therefore seems that in case of fairly illiquid CDS markets, the short term spreads recovered from the
bidding behavior in liquidity auctions may provide a more useful source of information about counterparty
risk and potential ﬁnancial trouble in the turbulent times of a crisis.
Liquidity management is central to banking.1 Keeping cash and other liquid assets, such as government
treasury bills, on the balance sheet is costly when banks could be using these resources for other purposes.
The fraction of total assets held by Canadian banks that are liquid has trended downwards since at least
1980, from approximately 30% to below 15%. Since 1994 Canadian banks have not faced any reserve
requirements, unlike American and European banks, there lacks a regulatory reason to hold liquid assets.2
The main reason to hold liquid assets is to manage day-to-day business operations and as a buﬀer in
case of negative funding shocks. During the summer and fall of 2007 concern over asset-backed securities
in Europe and the United States spilled over into Canada with a complete freeze of the ABCP market
(Zorn, Wilkins, and Engert (2009)). The Canadian banks, who were the primary issuers of ABCP, as
well as providers of lines of credit, took them back on their balance sheets, reducing their overall liquidity
positions.3 In addition, spreads in the interbank lending markets were increasing in Canada as they were
in the U.S. and Europe (see Figure 1). The Bank of Canada initially responded in a traditional manner,
i.e. by adding liquidity in the overnight market throughout the summer and fall of 2007. In late 2007
global banks began reporting dismal ﬁnancial returns, however, and interbank lending tightened further.
As evidence accumulated that the traditional endogenous liquidity creation mechanism was broken across
global markets, central banks, including the Bank of Canada, rethought their approach to liquidity injection.
The Bank of Canada joined other central banks by introducing term liquidity auctions.4
Figure 1 depicts the spread between unsecured interest rates and swap rates in Canada between 2006-
2009. The spread between the Canadian Dealer Oﬀered Rate (CDOR) and overnight index swap (OIS)
1For example see Ho and Saunders (1985) and Hamilton (1986) for early discussions of liquidity management by U.S.
banks and its importance for the Federal Funds rate.
2The banks’ regulator, the Oﬃce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) has set guidelines for banks
to maintain a stock of liquid assets appropriate for their cash ﬂow and funding needs. Furthermore, OSFI requires banks
where wholesale is more than 10 per cent of their total funding source to place internal limits on their short-term funding
requirements.
3There is a distinction between bank-sponsored ABCP which banks took back on their balance sheet and third-party ABCP
where a restructuring was necessary because this market froze completely during the summer of 2007. About one-third of the
market is made up of third-party ABCP while two-thirds is bank-issued ABCP. Banks did not have to take all of the ABCP
back on their balance sheet but did so for reputational reasons (e.g. Acharya et al. (2009)).
4On December 12 the Bank of Canada put out a joint press release with the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Swiss
Bank, and European Central Bank saying they were introducing measures to elevate pressures in short-term funding markets.
The ﬁrst term auction was the next day. See Chailloux et al. (2008) and Lavoie et al. (2011) for a review of central bank
responses to the crisis.
2rate can be thought of as a measure of tension in the Canadian interbank money market. The pattern
was very similar in the U.S. and EURO markets: immediately after August 2007 the spreads in money
markets substantially widened and culminated after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. There is already a
broad literature studying the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on term lending in the United States. This is
because problems were most obvious in this market. The Federal Reserve introduced three main facilities
during the ﬁnancial crisis: (i) Term Auction Facility, (ii) Term Securities Lending Facility, (iii) Primary
Dealer Credit Facility. The majority of studies focus on the eﬀectiveness of these facilities in bringing down
spreads in the interbank market for term loans. The large spreads were caused by two factors: counterparty
risk and liquidity demand. Taylor and Williams (2009) focus on counterparty risk and ﬁnd that TAF had
no eﬀect on the interbank market. Wu (2008) separates out both risks and claim that TAF was eﬀective
in satisfying banks liquidity demand, which did reduce the stresses of the interbank market.
Our analysis of liquidity demand focuses on heterogeneity in risk and bids in the Bank of Canada’s
liquidity facilities. We document that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there
was a short period of distress, in which Canadian banks oﬀered a substantial spread over the reference
interest rate in order to get a short-term loan from the Bank of Canada. This period of distress, however,
lasted only two months, after which the banks returned to their pre-Lehman collapse behavior. This diﬀers
markedly from the situation in Europe – Cassola, Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2011) analyze the repo auctions of
the European Central Bank and document a persistent change in bidding behavior by market participants.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate demand curves submitted in these European auctions during 2007. Cassola
et al. (2011) argue that this increased bidding aggressiveness was likely due to a persistent increase in
demand for liquidity by European banks as the outside option of procuring liquidity on the interbank
market deteriorated. Banks were thus willing to pay rates even in the primary market (the repo auctions)
that were much higher than the reference overnight rate.5
The situation in Canada was remarkably diﬀerent. While the default probabilities of individual banks
implied by the prices of their respective CDS contracts followed a similar pattern as their European coun-
terparts, the Canadian banking system showed very limited signs of stress (or increase in liquidity demand)
in 2007 and in the ﬁrst half of 2008. In particular, the Canadian banks were much less willing to pay a
premium above the reference overnight rate to obtain liquidity from the Bank of Canada. Figure 4 depicts
the aggregate bidding functions in each auction that the Bank of Canada conducted before September
2008. It suggests that virtually all banks judged that even if they would not have their demands in these
auctions satisﬁed, they could secure the liquidity elsewhere and hence were bidding at, or very close to,
5Evidence in Eisenschmidt, Hirsch, and Linzert (2009) suggests this continued throughout 2008 until rule changes in
October led to a single-price auction where anybody could borrow as much as they like at the posted rate. The rule change
was due to the increased demand for liquidity by European banks.
3the reference overnight rate (OIS).
Immediately following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the demand for liquidity by both North-American
and European banks went through another period of tremendous turmoil. Canadian banks, whose liquidity
demands did not seem to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected during the dawn of the subprime market crisis in 2007,
seemed to have suﬀered a period of high turbulence in the period immediately following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. As illustrated in Figure 5 Canadian banks bid aggressively for liquidity provided by the
Bank of Canada only in October and November 2008. We ﬁnd the same pattern in auctions of liquidity
with 1-day, 1-month and 3-months maturities. This suggests that following Lehman’s collapse banks’
willingness-to-pay for both a very short (an overnight) loan and for longer-term loans increased, albeit
temporarily.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 we describe the data and present some summary
statistics. In section 2 we go through the results of our analysis and section 3 concludes.
1 Data
In this section, we describe in detail the various data sources that we employ. We link together detailed
data on banks’ balance sheets, their bilateral trades with other banks and behavior in various types of
liquidity facilities.
1.1 Canadian Banking Sector Background
The Canadian banking sector is highly concentrated, with 90 per cent of the industry’s assets held by the
six largest banks, worth a total of $2,605 billion as of March 2010.6 The Canadian banking landscape also
includes a large regional co-operative network – the Desjardins Movement in Quebec, a provincially owned
deposit-taking institution – Alberta’s ATB Financial, hundreds of small credit unions, about sixty-ﬁve
foreign bank subsidiaries, and a small number of trust companies.
Larger Canadian ﬁnancial institutions have an informational advantage over smaller institutions stem-
ming from the tiering of the payments system and securities dealings.7 Alfonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010)
suggest that the likely reason they do not ﬁnd liquidity hoarding in Fedwire while Acharya and Mer-
rouche (2010) ﬁnd liquidity hoarding in the Sterling money market is tiering. Tiering in a payments net-
work refers to an organizational structure whereby some ﬁnancial institutions participate directly (“direct”
6These banks are the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Banque Nationale, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
Royal Bank Financial Group, and TD Bank Financial Group.
7This is also the case in the United Kingdom where the payments system is also characterized by signiﬁcant tiering.
4clearers) while other ﬁnancial institutions participate indirectly (“indirect” clearers). Chapman, Chiu, and
Molico (2010) present a model illustrating how tiering can improve eﬃciency and cost savings by reducing
informational frictions in the interbank market. Savings are achieved because direct participants provide
intraday credit to indirect participants. The associated cost, however, is that if an indirect participant de-
faults the direct participant is on the hook for the payments. Research from the recent crisis suggests there
might be another cost to tiering. Alfonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) examine (U.S.) Fedwire - a system
with almost no tiering and do not ﬁnd evidence of liquidity hoarding. Acharya and Merrouche (2010) study
the Sterling money market where there is substantial tiering and ﬁnd evidence of liquidity hoarding. The
diﬀerent ﬁndings between these two studies suggests another cost of tiering might be that in times of crisis
a tiered system could induce liquidity hoarding. Direct participants might hoard liquidity because of an
increase in credit risk of their indirect participants and not for precautionary reasons as in Allen, Carletti
and Gale (2009) or Diamond and Rajan (2009), or increase in credit risk of other direct participants as in
Flannery (1996) or Furﬁne (2001).
1.2 Counterparty Risk Implied by CDS Prices
Credit default swap contracts rose to prominence during the ﬁnancial crisis with the U.S. Treasury’s bail-
out of AIG. These types of contracts had been traded since the early 1990s, however, and publicly listed
prices of CDS contract on a bank’s debt, for example could be used to measure counterparty risk.8
Figure 6 shows the time series of the prices9 of a 5-year credit default swap contract for 8 banks in our
sample. A CDS contract is essentially an insurance contract: the buyer (who may or may not actually
hold a bond issued by the bank whose CDS contract he/she purchases) is protected against default of this
bank over the duration of the contract. In the event of default, the seller of the insurance contract has
to pay either the face value of the bond in exchange for it or the diﬀerence between the face value and
the recovery value of the bond.10 As elsewhere, the market perception of default risk of Canadian banks
captured in the prices of the CDS contracts started increasing in the second half of 2007 and peaked in
the last quarter of 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Using the standard
formula (see e.g., Hull (2007)):
Pr(Default   5y)T = 100  (1   (1/(1 + (cdsT/10000)/(1   recovery))T))
8Even before the collapse of AIG some research had started to focus on the counterparty risk of the insurer in the CDS
market. See for example Thompson (2010) and Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaﬀ (2010).
9We combined data from Bloomberg and Markit.
10Since 2009 CDS contracts have been standardized to require the seller of the insurance to pay the diﬀerence between the
face value of the bond and its market price as determined in an auction run after the default occurs.
5we can recover the risk-neutral default probabilities implied by the CDS prices. For the largest institutions,
banks A,E and K, the implied default probabilities (assuming 40 per cent recovery rates) went from close
to zero to over 15 per cent. Given the increase in default risk implied by the CDS contracts on the banks
in our sample we might expect an increase in liquidity hoarding during the crisis.
1.3 Large Value Transfer System (LVTS)
Unlike the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada does not impose any reserve requirements through
which it could control interest rates and liquidity, but implements monetary policy through the Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS). During our period of study LVTS included 14 direct participants and the
central bank.11 LVTS is a payment and settlement system operated by the Canadian Payments Association
through which all interbank trades have to be settled by the end of the trading day - and any potential short
or long positions must be settled by the appropriate trade with the Bank of Canada at rather unfavorable
interest rates. This interest rate band (the diﬀerence between the rate on overnight deposits and overnight
loans) is set so that banks have the incentives to ﬁnd counterparties among themselves to settle the open
positions rather than to resort to the central bank. The midpoint of this band is the central bank target
rate.
Like real-time gross settlement systems, which are used in almost all countries, including the United
States (Fedwire) and Europe (TARGET), ﬁnality of payment sent through LVTS is in real-time. Unlike
real-time gross settlement systems systems, however, settlement in LVTS occurs on a multilateral net basis
at the end of the day. This results in substantial cost savings in terms of the amount of collateral a
participant needs to put into the system. The trade-oﬀ is an increase in default risk.
During the trading day, there are two ways of engaging in a transaction in LVTS with another bank.
A bank can either send a payment through a fully collateralized Tranche 1 (T1) which involves real-time
settlement or through Tranche 2 (T2) in which collateral is pooled, risk is shared and settlement takes
place at the end of the trading day. The two main diﬀerences between the two tranches are the costs and
the risk. T1 is fully collateralized and is therefore more costly in terms of the opportunity cost of capital.
In normal times participants prefer to send payments through T2 because the collateral requirements
are much smaller than in T1. The typical collateral accepted in LVTS are government of Canada securities;
participants can ﬁnd more productive uses for these highly liquid securities than to have them sit in the
11The direct participants include the Big 6 banks, Laurentian Bank, foreign banks with branches in Canada (State Street
Bank, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, HSBC), the largest co-operative movement in Canada (Caisse Desjardins) and a
provincially owned deposit-taking institution (Alberta Treasury Branches) as well as a credit union consortium (Central 1
Credit Union). Any deposit-taking institution and member of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) can be a member
of LVTS so long as they maintain an account with the Bank of Canada and have the facilities to pledge collateral for LVTS
purposes. Deposit-taking institutions that are not members of LVTS must send (or receive) their payments through one of
the direct participants.
6payments system. T2 operates by banks extending bilateral credit lines (BCL) to each other, which may
be adjusted at any time. Providing credit lines, however, is not costless. The banks have to post collateral
with the Bank of Canada which is proportional to the extended credit lines and the size of the credit
lines extended towards a potentially failing bank determine a bank’s exposure in case of a failure of that
particular bank. Therefore T2 is a payment system where the survivor pays (whereas the defaulter pays
in T1).
Our data consist of daily credit lines and T1 and T2 interbank transactions. Our data set thus provides
us with a unique opportunity to study whether the banks manage their collateral eﬃciently - for example
by reserving the highest collateral for the bilateral transactions on the interbank market in order to secure
better rates. Our data covers the time period between 03/01/2004 and 08/31/2009. As expected, when
the need arises, credit lines are adjusted upwards: conditional on an adjustment, the mean credit line is
$841 million (standard deviation $757 million).12 A striking feature of this data is reciprocity: a bank very
often extends to and obtains from another bank the same credit line. While the amount of the credit line
varies depending on the pair of banks, reciprocity is quite regular. The mean credit line is $400 million
with a standard deviation of $484 million. To illustrate the level of reciprocity, the mean credit line (over
the whole time period) extended by bank labeled S in our sample to bank N is $758.7 million, while the
mean credit line from N to S is $758.9 million. The standard deviations are $62 million and $67 million,
respectively. The credit lines between these two banks are adjusted during the day in about 2% of the
cases. This description is representative of the other pairs in our data.
1.4 Liquidity
Financial institutions manage their daily liquidity needs through market operations and their interactions
with the Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada’s primary objective in providing liquidity intraday and
overnight to the banking system is to reinforce the target rate (The target rate as well as the one-month and
three-month overnight index swap rates are plotted in Figure 2). The main facility is LVTS, occasionally
supplemented by open market operations such as special purchase and resale agreements and sale and
repurchase agreements. These repo transactions are used to reinforce the target rate. In addition the Bank
provides liquidity to LVTS participants facing shortfalls in their end-of-day settlement balances at the Bank
Rate, and in rare cases ﬁnancial institutions can request Emergence Lending Assistance if they are facing
serious liquidity problems. The Bank of Canada also manages the federal government’s cash balances by
holding twice-daily auctions. Financial institutions can access short-term loans in these auctions. When
markets froze during the crisis ﬁnancial institutions reliance on the central bank for liquidity grew in
12All dollar ﬁgures are Canadian currency.
7importance. During the crisis ﬁnancial institutions accessed the aforementioned facilities and the Bank of
Canada created new ones to inject more liquidity into the system.
1.4.1 Receiver General Auctions
The Bank of Canada is the Canadian governments ﬁscal agent and as such manages the Receiver General
account from which the balances required for day-to-day operations are drawn. To manage its cash balances,
the Bank of Canada holds twice-daily auctions through which it auctions oﬀ short-term loans, whereby it
secures short-term interest income on its revenues. All auctions are held at 9:30am and at 4:30pm. Bidders
are notiﬁed before 5pm the day before the morning auction about the cash balances being oﬀered at auction
in each concurrently oﬀered tranche, where each tranche diﬀers by maturity. The maturity is between 1
and 21 days, with 93% of oﬀers in our sample being for loans with less than 7 day maturity. Similarly, by
4pm, bidders are notiﬁed of balances and tranches oﬀered in the afternoon auction. All afternoon auctions
are unsecured and balances are termed for one business day. The morning auctions can be both secured
or unsecured and the terms can be more than one day. These auctions have been analyzed in Chapman,
McAdams and Paarsch (2007) who ﬁnd that bidders’ behavior is reasonably approximated by a Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium. In this paper we focus solely on the unsecured morning auctions. Our data set included
bids (size,rate) from the morning Receiver General auctions between 01/02/2007 and 04/20/2009.
1.4.2 Term Purchase and Resale Agreement Auctions (PRA)
As the ﬁnancial crisis unfolded it became clear that traditional liquidity injections were ineﬀective in
getting liquidity from direct participants to market participants. In order to provide an additional source
of liquidity to alleviate potential stresses, the Bank of Canada conducted two 1-month repo auctions in
December 2007.13 This was the ﬁrst time that the Bank of Canada held cash auctions beyond one business
day to support liquidity funding.14 The PRA auctions were multiple yield competitive auctions, or in the
language of auction theory, discriminatory auctions. The amounts of the initial auctions were small, $2
billion. Bidders could place up to 3 bids, with the minimum bid of $10 million with increments of $1 million.
Participants rated A or higher had a bidding limit of 25 per cent of the auctioned amount and those rated
BBB or lower had a bidding limit of 12.5 per cent of the aggregate limit. Initially only primary dealers
could participate in the auctions. This includes RBC Dominion Securities, CIBC World Markets, Scotia
Capital, BMO Nesbitt Burns, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Banque Nationale Financi` ere, Valeurs Mobili` eres
13The broad principle that underlined the liquidity facility was to maintain liquidity in the ﬁnancial system while minimizing
distortions (Selody and Wilkins (2010)).
14Longer-term repos had been widely used by other central banks pre-crisis, most notably the Reserve Bank of Australia,
but also the ECB and Bank of England. Canada, like the U.S., however, did not use long-term repos until the crisis.
8Laurentienne, Desjardins Valuers Mobili` eres, HSBC Securities Canada, Casgrain & Co., Deutsche Bank
Securities, and Merrill Lynch Canada. The majority of these primary dealers are simply the securities
subsidiary of a larger parent company. RBC Dominion Securities, for example, is the securities subsidiary
of Royal Bank Financial Group. The Big 6 banks and the largest credit union, Caisse Desjardins all
participated in the term PRA auctions via their securities dealers.15 Almost all of the primary dealers
are members of LVTS (via the parent company), but some members of LVTS are not primary dealers.
The set of eligible collateral was of high quality assets – it included securities issued or guaranteed by the
Government of Canada and provincial of governments as well as bankers’ acceptances and bearer deposit
notes with remaining maturities of less than 180 days.
After the December 2007 term auctions problems in funding markets quickly faded and the Bank of
Canada stopped providing term liquidity. Following the collapse of Bear Sterns in March 2008, however,
the Bank reintroduced term PRAs, this time on a biweekly basis. Throughout the spring and summer the
Bank auctioned oﬀ $1 to $2 billion of cash at 1-month terms. The Bank also expanded the set of eligible
collateral in LVTS so that participants could more easily secure funding in the term PRA auctions as well
as in other markets. For example, the Bank allowed certain type of asset-backed commercial paper to be
pledged in LVTS, freeing up higher quality collateral which could then be posted in the term PRA auctions
or in the repo market.
Following the collapse of Lehman in September 2008, the Bank of Canada added repo auctions with
3-months maturity and held them on a weekly basis.16 Each auction was for $2 or $4 billion, i.e. “com-
mensurate with market conditions.” That September the Bank also expanded the set of eligible collateral.
Participants could now pledge certain commercial paper and short-term municipal paper, corporate, mu-
nicipal, and foreign issuer bonds with a minimum S&P rating of A-, marketable securities issued by the
U.S. treasury, and bank-sponsored unaﬃliated asset-backed commercial paper.17 By accepting a wider
range of assets as collateral the Bank of Canada in eﬀect reduced the illiquidity premium of those assets.
Consistent with the G7 Action Plan in October 14th the Bank modiﬁed its liquidity facilities further so
as to provide exceptional liquidity to the ﬁnancial system. First, the Bank substantially increased the size
of the term auctions to as much as $12 billion. At its peak the amount of liquidity the Bank of Canada
auctioned was 2% of the value of total bank assets. In the U.S. the peak was about 7% and in the Euro
area the peak was 5%, again of total banking system assets.
Second, LVTS members that were not primary dealers became eligible to participate in the repo auc-
15The majority of the primary dealers are large players. We do not know the assets of Casgrain because it is a private
company, but for the other players Laurentienne is the smallest with $22.6 billion in assets in 2010; RBC is the largest
Canadian bank with $655 billion in assets in 2010.
16For monetary policy reasons the Bank of Canada also introduced 6- and 12-month loan-maturity starting in April 2009.
17For a full list see http : ==www:bankofcanada:ca=en=notices fmd=2008=not230908:html.
9tions. This includes ATB, Credit Union Central of Canada, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, and State
State Bank. Thirdly, the Bank announced on October 17, 2008 that (eligible) LVTS participants would
be temporarily allowed to pledge their non-mortgage loan portfolio as collateral for LVTS and Standing
Liquidity Facility purposes.18 A ﬁnancial institutions’ non-mortgage loan portfolio (NMLP) is highly illiq-
uid (for example it includes credit card and personal loans) and the Bank took a 40 per cent haircut.
This measure intended to free-up more marketable securities to support borrowing or be used in the term
PRA.19
Table I oﬀers some summary statistics of our sample of the bids in the term PRA auctions. The average
number of bidders is 9 and the number of submitted bids averages less than 2. The average amount issued
in PRAs was $4.76 billion and the yield bid (expressed as a spread over the overnight index swap (OIS))
is quite low, 0.04, with a minimum of -0.58 basis points and a maximum of 92 basis points.
[Table I]
2 Results
During the ﬁnancial crisis central banks and ﬁnancial institution regulators appeared very concerned with
illiquidity and then insolvency of important ﬁnancial institutions. In this section we analyze the liquidity
positions taken by Canada’s main ﬁnancial institutions and test how closely it relates to the ﬁnancial
market’s perceptions of these institutions risk.
2.1 Measuring stress using banks' bids for central bank-provided liquidity
Like many central banks during the crisis an important question for the Bank of Canada was how much
demand existed for term liquidity. We use data for auctions of liquidity with maturity of 1-3 days adminis-
tered by the Bank of Canada on behalf of the Receiver General and of 1- or 3-month term PRA operations
conducted by the Bank of Canada. To recover banks’ true willingness-to-pay from the observed bids, we
assume that they employ bidding strategies that are consistent with a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. This
strategy is quite standard in the auction literature and in the case of discriminatory auctions has been
employed previously in the context of the European short-term loan auction by Cassola et. al (2011). They
18Foreign-bank participants could not pledge their NMLP and credit unions could only pledge the credit card portion of
their portfolio.
19Chailloux et al. (2008) discuss cross-country diﬀerences in collateral policies pre-crisis and how this aﬀected central bank
responses during the crisis. Canada, like the U.S. had a much narrow set of eligible collateral for its open market operations
and standing lending facilities than the ECB. During the crisis changes to collateral requirements was one way the Bank of
Canada could free of liquidity. The fact that the central bank was taking on more credit risk – bad collateral was clearly
driving out good collateral (a form of Gresham’s Law) – was less of a concern that getting liquidity to the market. Central
banks would point out, however, that they took signiﬁcant haircuts were applied to this new collateral.
10show that accounting for the strategic component of bids is empirically important, since many banks in-
crease their bids during the crisis not necessarily because of their increased willingness-to-pay (for example
due to a higher need for liquidity), but rather as a best response to more aggressive behavior by some of their
rivals. Using the same method as Cassola et. al (2011), we recover the true marginal willingness-to-pay
from the observed bid from the equilibrium relationship:
v (qk,θi) = bk +
Pr(bk+1  Pc)
Pr(bk > Pc > bk+1)
(bk   bk+1), (1)
where Pc is the market clearing price, which is random from the perspective of each bidder, qk is the quantity
demanded at step k and bk is the associated bid. This relationship basically says that in equilibrium of a
discriminatory auction, bidders will shade their bids so as to trade-oﬀ the eﬀect of saving due to shading
against the decreased probability of winning.
Figure 8 depicts the aggregate willingness-to-pay curve corresponding to the bids for the 1-month term
PRA. This picture suggests that the Canadian banks did not seem to have been hard pressed for liquidity
except for the turbulence period in October 2008. During that period, some banks were willing to pay up
to a 140 basis points premium over the reference interest rate to obtain a 1-month loan. This is perhaps
surprising since in the same time, banks could borrow overnight from the central bank at the premium of
50 basis points, which might suggest that the temporal distinction between obtaining a loan for 1-month
versus rolling over overnight loans might have been an important trade-oﬀ in that turbulent time period.
Turning our attention to the Receiver General auctions, perhaps surprisingly, given the very short-
maturity structure of these loans, we ﬁnd the same general story. In Figure 9 we plot aggregate bids
in 20 randomly chosen auctions for overnight loans from the ﬁrst 8 months of 2008. It is evident that
banks were not willing to pay more than the reference interest rate, and in most cases were oﬀering yields
signiﬁcantly below this rate - up to 25 basis points lower, with some auctions even clearing at such a low
price. Figure 10 depicts a diﬀerent 20 randomly chosen auctions from the period of turbulence following
the collapse of Lehman Brothers until December 2008. As in the term auctions, banks started oﬀering a
premium over the reference interest rate in order to obtain liquidity. Only a few auctions cleared below
the reference interest rate - and only minimally so. Many auctions, on the other hand, cleared at prices
about 5 basis points higher than the reference interest rate. After December 2008, bidding again returned
to its pre-Lehman state: virtually no bid exceeded the reference interest rate thereafter.
We begin our regression analysis by studying the relationship between the spread over the index swap
rate (OIS) that an individual bank is oﬀering to pay to obtain a repo-loan from the Bank of Canada in
11one of the liquidity auctions and key determinants of risk.20
Table II summarizes the results. It is immediately visible that controlling for bank heterogeneity using
bank ﬁxed eﬀects is important; otherwise several variables would have a counterintuitive sign. For example,
the larger the share of conventional mortgages, i.e. low loan-to-value mortgages, to total assets, the lower
the spread. The results depict a convincing picture that the bids are strongly related to the share of retail
deposits, the share of mortgages, and to Merton’s (1974) measure of distance to default. The distance
to default measures the market value of a ﬁnancial institutions assets relative to the book value of its
liabilities. Merton’s insight was that we could use the Black and Scholes (1973) framework to solve for the
asset value and volatility of any ﬁrm using the value and volatility of their equity. Given asset values and
volatility, as well as a risk-free rate, the distance to default is calculated as follows:
DD =






It follows that the smaller the distance to default the larger the probability the bank will default on its
debt. A negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on distance to default, therefore is consistent with ﬁnancial
institutions that are further away from default bidding less for liquidity in the term PRA auctions. Unlike
the correlation between distance to default and bidding we do not ﬁnd a similar correlation between CDS
prices and bids. This is true irrespective of whether or not we control for distance to default. This suggests
that banks own valuation for liquidity via their bids is not correlated with CDS prices.
We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between banks’ bids and their share of liquid assets to total
assets or the amount of liquidity they obtained through the TAF. The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was the
United States Federal Reserve’s extraordinary liquidity facility implemented in December 2007 to extend
collateralized term loans to deposit-taking institutions. Canadian banks with operations in the U.S. could
bid at the auctions for 1 and 3 month loans. Unlike the Bank of Canada’s Term PRA facility the TAF was a
single-price auction.21 TAF was another way Canadian banks could access liquidity, but more importantly
a way for Canadian banks to access U.S. dollar liquidity. The 5 major banks accessed TAF dollars, largely
in the period immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but the amount accessed did not
aﬀect their bids in the Term PRA.22
20Given the competitive outcome of the term PRA auctions it turns out that there is very little diﬀerence between using
bids and willingness-to-pay. This is very diﬀerent than the ECB auctions analyzed in Cassola, Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2011).
21On November 12th, 2008 the Bank of Canada announced it would provide exceptional liquidity to ﬁnancial institutions
under a Term Loan Facility (TLF). The TLF was a single price auction and the primary goal was to further increase ﬂexibility
in providing 1-month term liquidity since participants could use NMLP as eligible collateral. One eﬀect of TLF would be
to remove the stigma associated with the Emergency Lending Assistance program (see Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and
Shrader (2010) for the eﬀects of stigma in the Fed’s discount window and its eﬀects on bidding in TAF by American banks
during the crisis). There was very little demand, however, for TLF.
22In addition to the variables presented in Table II we also looked at bank issuance of equity and domestic and foreign debt
using the SDC database and found insigniﬁcant eﬀects.
12[Table II]
2.2 Balance sheet indicators
Canadian banks have to report the detailed structure of their balance sheets to the Bank of Canada,
regulator (the Oﬃce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions), and the deposit insurer (Canada
Deposit Insurance Corporation) on a monthly basis. Somewhat coarser information about balance sheets
is published on the regulator’s website and thus becomes subsequently public. In Figure 11 we plot the ratio
of cash to total assets for all banks in our data and Figure 12 depicts the evolution of the share of liquid
to total assets. Figure 13 shows the evolution of the share of residential mortgages among total assets.
These ﬁgures show that in the summer of 2007 as Canadian banks brought back oﬀ-balance sheet items
to the balance sheet their share of liquid assets to total assets fell. These ﬁgures also show however, that
immediately following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers banks started working hard to substitute away
from illiquid assets. The share of cash in their asset portfolio increased substantially between September
15, 2008 and December 2008 which corresponds to the time period when banks were bidding aggressively
in the liquidity auctions.
At the same time banks were aggressively bidding for cash in the term PRA program banks also took
advantage of a government mortgage buy-back program known as the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program
(IMPP). Details of the IMPP are provided in the Appendix. The IMPP allowed participating ﬁnancial
institutions to reduce their exposure to residential mortgages. For a short period of time between the start
of the IMPP program in October 2008 and December 2008 ﬁnancial institutions did this which explains
the drop in residential mortgages on the balance sheets. By January 2009, however, new mortgage lending
had picked up and for most ﬁnancial institutions the ratio of residential mortgages to total assets was back
to (or near) where it was pre-Lehman collapse.
2.3 Dynamics of overnight lending
Using the Furﬁne algorithm (Furﬁne (1999)) we were able to construct a series of (unsecured) overnight
lending on the interbank market between January 2007 and July 2009.23 While neither the total transacted
volume nor the average size of an individual loan changed substantially during the period of our data, the
interest rates varied substantially. Figures 14 and 15 plot our results. In particular, the data suggest that
there was excess liquidity in the market and banks were willing to lend cash overnight for less than the
23The idea behind the algorithm, as we apply it, is to look at ﬂows in the payment system and ﬁnd a payment  from bank
A to bank B in the late afternoon at date t and a return payment in the morning of date t + 1 of size (1 + i) and classify
these payments as loans. The price of the loan is i.
13target rate throughout the crisis, with the exception of the fall of 2007 during the ABCP crisis. At the
same time, the variance of the rates increased substantially during the crisis. We view these two facts
together as suggestive evidence that in the face of increased uncertainty banks took conservative liquidity
positions and thus were willing to lend cash at rates below the target to reliable counterparties, which was
not observed before the crisis.
For a deeper understanding of overnight lending patterns, we now broadly replicate the basic regression
exercise presented in Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) while also taking into account the events of the
summer of 2007 as in Acharya and Merrouche (2010). Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) focus on the
impact of the Lehman collapse on liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank
market. Their primary speciﬁcation is therefore the following:




+ αb + ϵb;t, (2)
where Fb;t is spread to target or log of loan size for bank (borrower/lender) b at time t, Date is a vector
of indicator variables, amount is the amount borrowed/lent overnight in the spread regression and αb is a
borrower/lender ﬁxed eﬀect. The dates of interest are DFri12, DMon15, and DTue16, corresponding to
the Friday before the Lehman collapse, the Monday of the Lehman collapse, and the Tuesday after. The
key result is that aggregate trading volumes in the Feds Funds market did not change during the crisis but
that the composition of the participants and the price and volumes at which they traded did change.
Acharya and Merrouche (2010) instead focus on the ABCP crisis in the summer of 2007 and its impact
on the demand for liquidity in the U.K. overnight interbank market. In the above notation they are
interested in measuring the impact of DAug9, i.e., the news of BNP Paribas closing two funds exposed to
the U.S. subprime crisis on Thursday August 2007, on overnight lending in the U.K. interbank market.24
The key result is that there was precautionary liquidity hoarding in the summer of 2007 and this increased
interbank rates, regardless of counterparty risk.
In Table 3 we report results combining the date indicator variables from each period and measure the
impact of both set of dates on interbank lending in the Canadian overnight market. Focusing ﬁrst on
the post-Lehman period, we ﬁnd strong evidence that Canadian banks were not hoarding liquidity in the
overnight interbank market. Neither prices or loan amounts appear to be aﬀected by the events surrounding
Monday September 15th. This is true on average (regressions which do not have bank ﬁxed eﬀects) and
at the bank level (regressions with bank ﬁxed eﬀects). Only on the 16th do we see a signiﬁcant drop in
24Given the reserve requirement framework in the U.K. the level of liquidity demanded (supplied) by any particular bank is
not strictly exogenously given by the idiosyncratic payments ﬂows throughout a day. Therefore Acharya and Merrouche (2010)
require an instrumental variable approach.
14spreads, although there was no change in amount borrowed or lent. Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010)
report a substantial change in borrower composition related to counterparty risk in the Feds Funds market.
Larger, worst-performing banks loss access to the overnight market, while smaller, better performing banks
increased their access to the market. Unlike Angelini, Nobini and Picillo (2009), however, who ﬁnd that
the most liquid lenders charge the highest rates (on the Italian interbank deposit market), which suggests
banks were hoarding liquidity, Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) do not ﬁnd any such evidence. We do
not ﬁnd a change in the average price or loan size or a change in the composition of borrowers and/or
lenders during the Lehman crisis. This suggests that Canadian banks did not hoard liquidity or that was
not an observable change in counterparty risk in the overnight interbank market.
It may not be surprising that the composition of overnight interbank participants remained the same
post-Lehman given that the Canadian market is a tiered structure, with only 14 direct participants. This
is in contrast to the Feds Fund market where there are potentially thousands of participants, and the
composition can and did change (Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010)). It is the change in borrower type in
the Feds Fund market which identiﬁes the increase in counterparty risk with no change in overall liquidity.
Turning the focus to the summer of 2007, as in Acharya and Merrouche (2010), we ﬁnd a slightly
diﬀerent story. The eﬀect of BNP Parisbas’ acknowledgement of the crisis on August 9th led to an increase
in overall spreads as well as borrower- and lender-speciﬁc spreads.25 The amount traded, however, did
not change on August 9th and 10th. At the end of day on August 13th there was an announcement of
disruption in the Canadian non-bank asset-backed commercial paper market, and this shows up in the
coeﬃcient on DAug13 14. Again spreads increased. Throughout the remaining part of summer and fall
of 2007 as banks brought back ABCP onto their balance sheet, spreads on the interbank market went
higher than the rest of the sample, as did the amounts traded. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients on the amount
borrowed (lent) with and without ﬁxed eﬀects are nearly identical. This indicates that the result of the
crisis was an upward shift in demand spread across the same borrowers pre-crisis and met by the same
lenders pre-crisis, but at a higher rate.26 On December 12th, 2007 the Bank of Canada implemented its
ﬁrst term PRA auction. At this point spreads in the overnight market fell back to their normal levels. As
mentioned above, things changed again following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
[Table 3]
25We pool the eﬀects of August 9th and 10th, although this is simply for brevity since the coeﬃcients for both days are of
the same sign and signiﬁcance. We do the same for August 13th and 14th.
26In results not reported here we interact the date dummy variables with the fraction of non-performing loans to total
assets. Given they ﬁnd a compositional change in lenders Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) use this approach to test for
hoarding. Since we do not have a change in composition of lenders this test is redundant. Nevertheless the coeﬃcients are all
insigniﬁcant, suggesting a lack of hoarding by the weaker banks.
152.4 Repo market
Gorton and Metrick (forthcoming) argue that the ﬁnancial crisis was centered around the repo market. As
counterparty risk increased concerns about the value and liquidity of collateral suﬀered a run due to higher
required haircuts. Similarly, Brunnermeier (2009) argues that repo lenders required more collateral, which
further drained the system of liquidity. In Figure 17 we depict the end of month outstanding balances
of repo transactions of the 12 largest Canadian banks. Similar to our analysis of the overnight interbank
market, there seems to be little evidence of any persistent impact of the crisis on the Canadian repo market.
Part of the repo transactions shifted from trade between private banks to trade with the Bank of Canada
via the purchase and resale agreement auctions, but the overall amount seems to be fairly constant over
the period of our study. Of course, this ﬁgure needs to be interpreted cautiously since the structure of the
outstanding collateral might have changed.
2.5 Liquidity risk or counterparty risk?
Sofar we have analyzed the demand for liquidity by Canada’s main ﬁnancial institutions. Balance sheet data
suggests that there was some liquidity hoarding, although results from the term PRA and Receiver General
Auctions suggest that this was largely isolated to an immediate period following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. The dynamics of overnight lending do not suggest liquidity hoarding. Another question relates to
intraday interbank counterparty risk during the ﬁnancial crisis. The dynamics of overnight lending suggest
very little evidence of changes in counterparty risk during the crisis. We analyze counterparty risk in more
detail in this section.
2.5.1 Counterparty Risk Implied by the Bilateral Credit Lines in LVTS
During the ﬁnancial crisis, the Bank of Canada substantially expanded the collateral deemed acceptable in
the payment system. In particular, most participants were allowed to pledge their whole non-mortgage loan
portfolio as collateral. This in turn meant that virtually every participant in the LVTS had an abundance
of unused collateral in the system. Since as described in section 1.3, the LVTS has two tranches: a fully
collateralized tranche, T1, and a partially collateralized one, T2 – it would thus seem natural that if the
opportunity cost of collateral vanishes and default probabilities of counterparties increases, banks would be
less reluctant to deal with their counterparties through T2 (and thus potentially bear some default risk).
In ﬁgure 16 we plot the time series of credit lines extended to bank K, which according to its CDS price
experienced the most dramatic increase in the probability of default. Clearly, K’s counterparties in the
LVTS did not fear that K might experience solvency problems since they neither refused to trade with K
16using T2, nor decreased the extended credit lines.
Finally, there does not seem to be any sign of banks being worried about their counterparties defaulting
as the overall share of transactions processed through the fully collateralized tranche of LVTS does not
appreciably increase either on the aggregate level or on the bilateral level.
2.6 Putting Everything Together
In the previous sections we oﬀered smaller bits and pieces of a puzzle. We showed that CDS prices
suggested a considerable increase in the default probability at least for some Canadian banks. Despite
this high degree of heterogeneity in implied default probability, banks’ behavior vis-` a-vis each other was
virtually unaﬀected. Even though all banks pledged excessive collateral into the payment system, they
did not require the “riskier” banks to send more payments through the fully collateralized channel or
reduced the credit lines extended to them. Moreover, the distribution of the willingness-to-pay for liquidity
across the diﬀerent banks, suggests that there is no signiﬁcant correlation with the CDS-implied default
probability: banks with high CDS prices do not seem to have higher value for liquidity obtained from
the central bank, corroborating the evidence that other banks’ behavior towards these “riskier” banks did
not change and hence it was probably not impossible to secure liquidity through other channels than the
auctions administered by the Bank of Canada.
Interestingly, Figure 8 of Taylor and Williams (2008), which shows the CDS prices of Bank of America,
JP Morgan and Wells Fargo being nearly identical throughout the crisis, while Citigroup CDS prices are
higher, suggesting the market thought that at least three of these banks were similarly risky. Therefore, it
would be interesting to look at the cross-sectional variation in rates paid in the Feds Fund market as well
as bidding behavior in TAF to see whether or not these institutions believed themselves to be as risky (or
riskier) than the market believed using data similar to that used in Afonso et al (2010).
We also showed that the usual measures of a bank’s ﬁnancial health, such as the ratio of liquid assets
on its balance sheets, improved throughout the crisis. One channel through which this change took place
was the insured mortgages purchase program. Banks used this tool extensively to sell mortgages from their
portfolio in exchange for liquidity. On the other hand, the situation stabilized very quickly and banks were
not reluctant to issue new mortgage loans.
Of course, the ultimate question that still remains to be answered is what was the cause of the quick
recovery from the shock of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Was it an action of the Bank of Canada or was
it simply the more conservative structure of Canadian banks’ balance sheets already on the onset of the
crisis? Answering this question convincingly would clearly have important implications for policy-makers.
173 Conclusion
As in most developed countries, the Canadian banking sector came under substantial stress during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. In this paper we document that, surprisingly, this stress lasted only for a few months
immediately following the demise of Lehman Brothers. By the end of 2008, the behavior of Canadian banks
did not exhibit any signs of anxiety and was virtually indistinguishable from their behavior prior to the
crisis, which is quite in contrast to European banks. We provide suggestive evidence that this was perhaps
due to a more conservative nature of portfolios that these banks held. Furthermore, we show that it
is rather hard to interpret the rising prices of credit default swap contracts during the crisis, since the
cross-sectional variation in the implied default probabilities is not reﬂected in other aspects of those banks’
transactions. This could be because the CDS market is illiquid, which is a point nicely illustrated in Duﬃe,
Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2005), or because direct participants have more information about risk than other
market participants.
We argue that looking at banks’ behavior in liquidity auctions organized by the central bank might
provide the Bank of Canada with a more accurate picture of the situation of the individual banks. The
spread over the index swap rate each bank is oﬀering to pay for a repo-loan is suggestive about how much
it is pressed for liquidity which it might not be able to secure elsewhere. Using an equilibrium model of
bidding, one can recover the willingness-to-pay from the bids, which is indicative of the opportunity cost of
obtaining funding from other sources (interbank markets). We show that in our application these spreads
are indeed related to various measures of bank’s solvency and riskiness from the balance sheets. The bids
thus may act as an aggregated snapshot of a bank’s situation.




































01jul2006 01jul2007 01jul2008 01jul2009
Date
CDOR−OIS: 1 Month CDOR−OIS: 3 Months
Difference in Unsecured Rate and Swap Rate
Figure 1 shows the daily CDOR and OIS rates. CDOR is the Canadian Dealer Oﬀered Rate and is equivalent to LI-
BOR/EURIBOR. It is the average rate for Canadian bankers’ acceptances for speciﬁc terms-to-maturity, determined daily
from a survey on bid-side rates provided by the principal market-makers, including the major Canadian banks. OIS is the
Overnight Index Swap rate. It is an over-the-counter derivative primarily used for hedging short-term funding costs or ex-
posures to short-term interest rate movements. OIS rates are calculated in reference to the CORRA, or Canadian Overnight
Repo Rate Average. In the U.S. the reference is the daily Fed Funds rate.














01jan2007 01jul2007 01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009
Bank target rate 1 mth OIS at closing
3 mth OIS at closing
Figure 2 shows the daily values of 1-month and 3-month OIS rates and the Target Rate of the Bank of Canada. Even though
in Canada OIS rates are calculated in reference to the CORRA, or Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average, they capture
expectations of the ﬁnancial markets with respect to the target rate well.
19Figure 3: Aggregate demand curves in European liquidity auctions during 2007































       Bidding Behavior in Auctions      
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
 
 
Aggregate Bid − EONIA (Before Turmoil)
Aggregate Bid − EONIA (After Turmoil)
Figure 3 is taken from Cassola, Horta¸ csu, and Kastl (2011). It shows the aggregate demand curves (horizontal sum of
individual bids) of the liquidity auctions help by the ECB in 2007.
Figure 4: Aggregate demand curves in Canadian liquidity auctions before Lehman Collapse





























Bidding Behavior in 1−M Auctions Before  Lehman Collapse  
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
 
 
Aggregate Bid − OIS
Since Figure 2 shows that OIS rates capture expectations of the ﬁnancial markets with respect to the target rate well, we use
them to express all bids as spreads over the expected target rate.
20Figure 5: Aggregate demand curves in Canadian liquidity auctions






























Bidding Behavior in Auctions      
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
 
 
Aggregate Bid − OIS − pre Lehman
Aggregate Bid − 9/19−11/4/2008
Aggregate Bid − post 11/4/2008
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start_date
Bank A Bank K
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Assumes 40% recovery
Figure 8: Willingness-to-pay for 1-m liquidity




































 Aggregate Marginal Valuation Curves  
 (Each line corresponds to an auction)
 
 
Marg val − OIS
22Figure 9: Bidding for overnight liquidity before Lehman Collapse





























Bidding Behavior in RG Auctions Apr−Sep 2008     
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
 
 
Aggregate Bid − Target
Figure 10: Bidding for overnight liquidity after Lehman Collapse




























Bidding Behavior in RG Auctions Oct−Nov 2008 (after Lehman Collapse)  
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
 
 
Aggregate Bid − Target



































First line: Lehman collapse. Second line: 2Dec2008. Third line: last −significant− IMPP auction


















































First line: Lehman collapse. Second line: 2Dec2008. Third line: last −significant− IMPP auction







































First line: Lehman collapse. Second line: 2Dec2008. Third line: last −significant− IMPP auction




































































































































































































Figure 14 shows the aggregate amount borrowed in the Canadian unsecured interbank market (in millions of Canadian dollars)
between January 2007 and April 20, 2009.





































































































































































Figure 15 shows two things: (1) the average spread between the rate paid for a loan and the Bank of Canada target rate in
the Canadian unsecured interbank market between January 2007 and April 20, 2009 and (2) the standard deviation in the
same spread.
Figure 16: Credit Lines to Financial Institution K in the Payment System
01jan2004 01jan2005 01jan2006 01jan2007 01jan2008 01jan2009 01jan2010
Figure 16 shows the bilateral credit lines in LVTS from all participants to ﬁnancial institution K from April 2004 to April
2009.
26Figure 17: End of Month Outstanding Balance of Repo Transactions of 12 largest Canadian Banks and













































































































The Term PRA balances include totals for all participants, including direct dealers.
27Figure 18: Putting it All Together
28Table I: Data Summary for Term PRA Auctions
Mean Min Max StdDev
Active bidders in an auction 9.3 5 12 1.86
Number of submitted bidpoints 1.87 1 5 0.88
Yield bid (normalized by OIS) 0.04 -0.58 0.92 0.15
Quantity Bids (as a share of supply) 0.14 0.0025 0.25 0.09
OIS rate 1.78 0.24 4.26 1.26
Issued Amount (billion CAD) 4.76 1 12 2.85
Table II: Explaining Bid-OIS Spread
The sample is from the ﬁrst Term PRA auction on December 12, 2007 to April 21, 2009 – when the facility was used for
monetary policy in addition to liquidity reasons and a minimum bid rate equal to the target rate of 25 basis points was set.
The dependent variable is the bid minus OIS. TAF is the U.S. Term Auction Facility run by the New York Federal Reserve.
TA is total assets. All balance sheet data are monthly. Distance-to-default is calculated using Merton (1974)’s model. The
price of the 5 year CDS contracts are based on the most liquid senior debt. Standard errors clustered at bank level.*,**,***
denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively.
Spread1 Spread2 dummies2 dummies3 dummies4 dummies5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








log(Liquid Assets/TA) 0.001 -.08 0.01 -.13 0.11 -.12
(0.03) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15) (0.06)
 (0.13)







log(Wholesale Deposits/TA) -.005 0.1 0.002 0.17 0.31 0.33
(0.1) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14)
 (0.29)





log(Insured Residential Mortgages/TA) -.03 0.19 -.02 0.12 -.01 0.1
(0.01)
 (0.14) (0.01) (0.19) (0.02) (0.17)
log(Allowances for Losses/TA) -.08 0.15 -.08 0.18 -.19 0.21
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09)
 (0.18)





log(1+Loan obtained at TAF) 0.008 0.01 0.006 0.01
(0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.02)






log(5-year CDS Contract) 0.002 0.06
(0.03) (0.05)
Obs. 162 162 162 162 144 144
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33A Appendix
A.1 Insured Mortgage Purchase Program
Following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers the Canadian government started a program in which it
oﬀered to buy back insured residential mortgages, called the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program (IMPP).
The government’s goal was to add liquidity to the banks balance sheets so that they could continue lending.
The only mortgages that were eligible were those already insured. The government argued that since they
were explicitly insuring the mortgages anyway, they were not taking on any excess risk by buying them
directly.27 The eﬀect would be to add liquidity to the banks balance sheet in the short-term and in the
medium- and long-term the government would likely make a proﬁt. On October 16, 2008 the Government
of Canada announced that it would buy up to $25 billion of insured mortgages oﬀ the books of Canadian
banks. The maximum was raised to $75 billion on November 12, 2008 and to $125 billion on January 28,
2009.
The CMHC held reverse auctions on the government’s behalf, held about once or twice a month. A
schedule of planned auctions was published before each quarter. For each auction the minimum bid was
set at a rate higher than the government’s cost of borrowing, either a ﬁxed rate for a pool of ﬁxed-term
mortgages (usually 5 years) or a ﬁxed premium above CDOR (Canadian Dealer Oﬀered Rate, which is the
Canadian equivalent to LIBOR) in the case of a pool of ﬂoating-term mortgages (also typically 5 years).
The minimum bid rate was set at 9:40am on the day of the auction and the bids had to be received by
10:00am. Funds were allocated beginning with the highest bid until the amount of available funds were
depleted, with settlement 5 days following the reverse auction.
Figure 19 oﬀers a picture of the development in the IMPP auctions. In the turbulence period following
the Lehman collapse during which the government started this program, Canadian banks were oﬀering a
high price in order to sell some of the residential mortgages. The supply (maximum amount to be pur-
chased by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation) was almost always exhausted until March 2009.
Moreover, banks were willing to accept a much lower amount than the face value and, more importantly,
were competing for the supply, thus driving the discount much higher than the reserve (the minimum
acceptable discount). The reserve discounts thus declines over time from 3.433% in November 2008 to
2.266% in January 2009 to 2.59% in February, 2.46% in March and 2.431% in April. While the reserve
27See Allen, Clark, and Houde (2011) for a detailed discussion of the Canadian mortgage market. Up until the ﬁnancial
crisis securitization was limited in the Canadian mortgage market. For example, about 17% of mortgages were securitized
in 2007. This is far less than in the United States where more than half of all mortgages were securitized. The lack of
securitization in Canada likely stems from the fact that mortgages are short-term (typically 5 years), and therefore Canadian
banks do not have as much incentive as U.S. banks to sell oﬀ the interest rate risk associated with selling a mortgage. During
the crisis, however, the level of mortgage securitization in Canada increased substantially – to 30% in 2009.
34discount did not change too much, banks’ interest in selling mortgages from their portfolio at that discount
disappeared relatively quickly.
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